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According to the Song critic Guo Ruoxu (ca. 1080), the last five laws by Xie
He (active 500–535?) are “open to study,” while qiyun 氣韻 (spirit
consonance) “necessarily involves an innate knowledge; it assuredly cannot
be secured through cleverness or close application, nor will time aid its
attainment. It is an unspoken accord, a spiritual communion; ‘something
that happens without one’s knowing how’” (Bush and Shih 2012, p. 95; Yu
1986, p. 59).1 For Guo Ruoxu, although the qiyun within a work refers to
the quality of a painting and cannot be identical with the qiyun of the artist,
the ability to produce a painting replete with qiyun is determined by the
painter’s innate mental disposition. This idea has been echoed by later artists
and critics.
Guo Ruoxu’s stress on painting as the “mind-print” of the artist and the
innate mental talent that determines whether a work is replete with qiyun
reminds one of Kant’s account of genius. For Kant, only genius can create
beautiful artwork (KU 5:307).2 He defines genius as “the inborn predisposi-
tion of the mind through which nature gives the rule to art” (KU 5:307). He
explains the innate mental talent further in terms of spirit as “the animating
principle of the mind,” which “is nothing other than the faculty for the
presentation of aesthetic ideas” (KU 5:313–314). Can we explain innate
mental talent in the context of classical Chinese painting along Kantian
lines, in terms of genius as the innate mental talent of idea-giving?3
Scholars have noted that yi 意 and shen 神 in the classical Chinese
artistic context appear to be the counterparts of Kant’s aesthetic idea and
spirit, respectively. Yu-kung Kao (1991, pp. 66, 87) borrows Kant’s term
“aesthetic idea” to refer to the yi (idea) in Chinese literature established in
the mind of an artist and later released into the work, and defines the shen
(spirit) of the Chinese artist as “the artist’s genius in creating an impression
or an idea and transmitting this idea through this art.”4 Karl-Heinz Pohl
(2006, p. 130) echoes Kao’s claim, suggesting that the use of “shen (spirit) or
shen si (spiritual thinking, i.e. imagination)” in Lu Ji’s (261–303) and Liu
Xie’s (465–522) texts appears consistent with the role Kant gives to spirit in
creating aesthetic ideas. Pohl (2006, p. 134) also sees a correspondencet & West Volume 70, Number 2 April 2020 354–373
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between the synonym of yi, yijing 意境 (“roughly ‘artistic idea’”) in Chinese
poetry criticism and Kant’s aesthetic idea.5
The following discussion will examine correspondences between two
pairs of terms in classical Chinese painting and in Kant’s account. First, I
will establish parallels between pictorial yi (along with yixiang, yijing) and
Kant’s aesthetic idea, and between the shen that animates yi and Kant’s
spirit animating the aesthetic idea. Second, I will consider some differences
between yi and Kant’s aesthetic idea, shen and Kant’s spirit, that appear to
challenge the efficacy of projecting Kant’s approach into the Chinese
context.
By introducing the notions of the aesthetic idea and the spirit, Kant
explains how genius as an innate mental talent works for idea-giving, which
is significant in artistic creation (KU 5:307, 314). When attempting to apply
Kant’s terms in the classical Chinese artistic context, even if yi corresponded
to the aesthetic idea, and shen to the spirit, we cannot say that the two
aspects of yi preceding the brush and shen stimulating yi determine that the
artist will create a work replete with qiyun. Even Kant does not suggest that
if an artist has the ideal mental talent of idea-giving, he would create a
beautiful work. Ignoring this may cause the reader to misunderstand my aim
in this article, which is to point out plausible parallels between these two
distinctive approaches and some problems raised by borrowing Kant’s terms
to illuminate how the innate mental state of a gifted classical Chinese artist
works for idea-giving in artistic creation.
The Idea-giving of Genius in the Context of Classical Chinese Painting
In this section, I will explore the parallels between yi and Kant’s aesthetic
idea, and shen and Kant’s spirit, before discussing differences between the
two approaches.
Parallels between Pictorial Yi and Kant’s Aesthetic Idea
According to Kant, the aesthetic idea is a “representation of the imagina-
tion,” in contrast to the rational idea; when aesthetic ideas are aroused, the
mind is moved to soar freely over “an immeasurable field of related
representation” (KU 5:314–316). Aesthetic ideas are expressed through an
artwork by genius (an innate mental disposition), and communicated to
audiences, and the beauty of art lies in “the expression of aesthetic ideas”
(KU 5:320). The aesthetic idea in the work appears to refer to the expressive
content of the work. Apparently similarly, in Yu-kung Kao’s (1991, p. 66)
discussion of yi in poetry, yi (idea) as an internalized symbol (of the object
depicted) is associated with the inner image in the artist’s mind, and the
idea-associated image is released into the final work.6 However, his
translation of yi in classical Chinese texts on painting as “intent” or
“meaning” seems mistaken (Kao 1991, pp. 85, 88). I suggest instead thatXiaoyan Hu 355
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aesthetic idea. First, the association of yi with xiang (image) is analogous to
Kant’s association of aesthetic idea with aesthetic attribute. Second, like the
aesthetic idea, pictorial yi is not a rational idea (strategy, intention or
meaning).
First similarity. Classical texts on Chinese painting provide evidence of
the first similarity, between the relationship of yi and xiang and that of the
aesthetic idea and the aesthetic attribute. The Song master Guo Xi (1000–-
1090) illustrates the significance of establishing yi and xiang in the painter’s
mind through an analogy with Chinese lute-making (see Bush and Shih
2012, pp. 157–158; Yu 1986, p. 640). His text suggests that if an artist’s
mind is in a state of clarity, it might easily grasp the idea, and let the perfect
mental image appear in front of his mind’s eye. However, when his mind is
in a state of confusion and ideas are confused, it is impossible to see the
clear mental image. Guo Xi’s contemporary and later artists’ and critics’
discussion of the perfect (mental) image established preceding the brush
echoes his text. For example, Su Shi (1037–1101) suggests the artist should
learn from Wen Tong (1019–1079), who formulates a perfect mental image
of the bamboo before painting it (Bush and Shih 2012, p. 207; Yu 1986, p.
1026). Similarly, Dong You (active early twelfth century) believes that, for a
painter painting horses, when the mental image of the horse has been
engraved in one’s mind, “a true horse will emerge” on the paper or silk
(Bush and Shih 2012, p. 216). The act of painting only demands that the
painter release the mental image onto the silk or paper without the
hindrance of looking at the object by “following the course from the mind
to the hand” (Gao 1996, p. 156). The Yuan critic Tang Hou (active
1320–1330) echoes that the difficulty of depicting a landscape cannot be
overcome “unless there are hills and valleys . . . as expansive as
immeasurable waves” in the painter’s mind (Bush and Shih 2012, p. 248).
Although Song and Yuan artists and critics do not use the term yixiang
in texts on painting, the Qing critic Fang Xun (1736–1799) explicitly
associates yi preceding the brush with the inner image (xiang) in the
painter’s mind:PhiThe ancients made painting in the way of “yi preceding the brush.” Du Fu was
said to paint a rock for ten days and water for five days. He did not mean to
[spend five or ten days on wielding the brush and ink] and then complete a
rock or water. The verses mean that one should first [take time to] build [idea-
images] (yixiang) in the mind, to have mountains and valleys in the breast; then
one can naturally attain swift brushwork. (Gao 1996, p. 154, with modifications;
Yu 1986, pp. 232–233)That is, when brilliant yi emerges in the artist’s mind, clear xiang (image) is
believed to correspondingly and simultaneously appear in front of his mind’s
eye. Having noted the relationship of yi and xiang in classical texts onlosophy East & West
Chinese painting, we can move on to the comparison with Kant’s account:
yi and xiang appear analogous to Kant’s aesthetic idea and aesthetic
attribute.
Although Kant does not use the term “image” explicitly, the mental
image is accommodated in his discussion of aesthetic attribute and aesthetic
idea: by furnishing “a multitude of related representations” through the
imagination, aesthetic attributes “yield an aesthetical idea, which serves that
idea of reason instead of logical presentation” (KU 5:315). Kant gives this
example of an aesthetic attribute: “Jupiter’s eagle, with the lightning in its
claws, is an attribute of the powerful king of heaven, as is the peacock of
the splendid queen of heaven” (KU 5:315). Thus an aesthetic attribute
appears to be a symbolic mental image, a signifier of the aesthetic idea.
“Ideas of reason, such as God or infinity, we can think, but not perceive.
Aesthetic ideas, as in good works of art, we can perceive, but not fully grasp
. . . . [A genius] can create an object for us to perceive that fits an idea of
reason in symbolic ways” (Wenzel 2006, p. 103). Since an aesthetic idea is
perceived in a symbolic way, it is inseparable from aesthetic attribute.
As discussed above, when the idea (yi) is established in the artist’s mind,
the clear mental image (the lute in Guo Xi’s text, the bamboo in Su Shi’s
text, the horse in Dong You’s text, the landscape in Tang Hou’s and Fang
Xun’s texts) that reflects or lodges the idea is expected to be released from
the artist’s mind into the work; if confused ideas and ambiguous images still
haunt his mind, the artist will not be able to produce good work. The
relationship between yi and xiang shows that as “the moldable substance in
the [artist’s] mind,” yi refers to “the idea at the moment when it is ready to
be presented in its final artistic form,” as if an aesthetic idea, on the brink of
presentation, is associated with an ‘image’ [xiang 象] in the mind. In this
sense yi is the internal symbol before its manifestation” (Kao 1991, p. 66).
Although Yu-kung Kao only discusses this in relation to literature, in view of
the relationship between yi and xiang examined above, the analogy of yi in
painting with the aesthetic idea appears plausible. When borrowing the
“aesthetic idea” to refer to yi in literature, Yu-kung Kao implies that the
mental image (xiang) refers to the aesthetic attribute. As seen above, the
analogy of xiang in painting with the aesthetic attribute also looks plausible.
Since Kant’s aesthetic idea as a representation of the imagination is
perceived in a symbolic way, Michael McGhee (2000, p. 105) interprets the
aesthetic idea as mental image: “An aesthetic idea is a particular representa-
tion of the imagination. In other words, it is an image, an image with
evocative power, an image which carries some of the charge of the universal
even in its particularity.” McGhee’s equating the aesthetic idea with the
image reminds us of the term yixiang (idea-image) used in Fang Xun’s
writing on painting cited above, and especially favored by modern and
contemporary Chinese aestheticians. Since the idea (yi) perceived is
embodied and lodged in the mental image and released into the final imageXiaoyan Hu 357
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to use the term yixiang to refer to the internalized expressive symbol that
appears in front of the painter’s mind’s eye and is later released into the
work, and can then be imagined by the audience.
On the one hand, although my initial aim is testing the efficacy of
applying Kant’s aesthetic idea to interpreting the yi established in the mind
of the Chinese artist, the Chinese term yixiang throws a light on McGhee’s
interpretation of the aesthetic idea as mental image, since the aesthetic idea
is always associated with the aesthetic attribute and can only be perceived
by imagination rather than being thought and fully grasped. Although for
Kant the aesthetic attribute is more like a visual image or symbol, which
furnishes the aesthetic idea, the aesthetic idea together with the aesthetic
attribute constitute the intuitive representation of an imagination with
evocative power. On the other hand, the analogy between yixiang and the
aesthetic idea also throws a light on the modern theory of yijing initially
proposed by Wang Guowei, to which I will turn very soon.
Second similarity. According to Kant, we think the rational idea rather
than perceive it, while the aesthetic idea is perceived and expressed in the
artwork through genius. Different from the rational idea, the aesthetic idea
as an intuitive representation of the imagination cannot even “be completely
compassed and made intelligible by language” (Pohl 2006, p. 132). As
argued above, pictorial yi is perceived in the mind and associated with the
mental image, and later is released into the image of the final work. We can
see another similarity: neither Chinese pictorial yi nor Kant’s aesthetic idea
is a rational concept or conception.
One might question my argument, claiming that yi preceding the brush
can be understood as intention or strategy or plan.7 For instance, Xiongbo
Shi (2018, pp. 871, 876, 880–881) employs two main categories of yi
classified by Zhang Dainian and argues that yi preceding the brush in
calligraphy can refer to the artist’s intention. In calligraphy, Wang Xizhi
(321–379) suggests that yi preceding the brush requires calligraphers to
formulate the strategy for realizing the intention of “fighting with the
medium,” “achieving an effect within a particular time and space,” and
lodging the mental image into the work (Gao 1996, p. 153). In the case of
painting, it is also important for a painter to take time to contemplate the
motif and consider the strategy for composition before wielding his brush.
For instance, the Yuan critic Rao Ziran (active ca. 1340) indicates that
formulating the motif and strategic plan before painting is essential to avoid
the faults of “overcrowded compositions” and of “scenes without levels and
risings” (Bush and Shih 2012, pp. 266–267; Yu 1986, pp. 691–692).
However, it should be stressed that intention or strategy or plan is not
the key point emphasized by classical painters and critics. After observing
the painting process of the master Zhang Zao (active in the late eighth
century), the Tang critic Fu Zai (813) comments that “[Zhang Zao’s] ideasPhilosophy East & West
reach into the dark mysteries of things, and for [Zhang Zao], things lay not
in the physical senses, but in the spiritual part of his mind. And thus he was
able to grasp them in his [mind], and make his hand accord with it” (Bush
and Shih 2012, p. 85, my emphasis; Yu 1986, p. 20). Similarly, as the Tang
critic Zhang Yanyuan (847) applauds, Wu Daozi’s (ca. 680–759) art
perfectly illustrates “what was described as formulating [yi] before using the
brush, so that, when the painting is finished [yi] is present” (Bush and Shih
2012, p. 62, with modifications; Yu 1986, p. 36). In both Fu Zai’s and
Zhang Yanyuan’s texts, yi is better understood as idea instead of intention or
strategy or plan. Otherwise, the painter would only need to realize his
original aim and objectives by work rather than presenting and releasing
them into the work. It is undeniable that before painting a painter should
have a strategic intention, which might involve deciding the object depicted,
considering the subject-matter or motif, setting the strategic plan for the
composition, and thinking about the painting material, et cetera. However, it
would be superficial and inaccurate to understand pictorial yi as merely the
intention or strategy or plan formulated before the artist uses his brush.
Indeed, classical Chinese artists favor artistic spontaneity as something
between what is intentional (youyi) and what is unintentional (wuyi), and
they advocate forgetting conscious intention during spontaneous creation.
As the Qing painter Wang Yuanqi (1642–1715) claims when admitting his
failure to imitate the Yuan master Ni Zan (1301–1374), Ni Zan’s success in
untrammeled expression through painting lies in effortless spontaneity
between youyi and wuyi (Nelson 1983, p. 410).8
For Kant, no aesthetic idea as intuitive representation of the imagination
can be adequate to a rational idea, and no rational idea can be adequate to
an aesthetic idea. Intention and strategy fall within the scope of the rational
idea, and the rational idea as the counterpart of the aesthetic idea only
occurs in the very beginning of the creative process of genius as understood
by Kant (KU 5:314). This accords with my point above that intention or
strategy or plan is not the understanding of yi emphasized by classical
Chinese artists and critics. As seen above, the differentiation of yi from the
rational idea applies not only to literature as Yu-kung Kao (1991, p. 66)
argues, but to painting as well.
It should be stressed also that it is inappropriate to regard Kant’s
aesthetic idea as a cognitive idea, although it can affect cognition (Matherne
2013, pp. 33–38).9 Thus, due to the parallels between pictorial yi or yixiang
and Kant’s aesthetic idea explained above, it is inappropriate and superficial
to regard yi in the context of painting as a cognitive idea or meaning. I note
that one of Xiongbo Shi’s (2018, pp. 871, 876–881) claims regarding yi
(idea) in Chinese calligraphy as analogous to Kant’s aesthetic idea echoes
Yu-kung Kao’s suggestion of the role of yi in literature, while he also agrees
with Zhang Dainian (2002, p. 409) that yi is to be regarded as a cognitive
idea. That equating Kant’s aesthetic idea with cognitive idea constitutes aXiaoyan Hu 359
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in the parallels between yi in Chinese art and Kant’s notion of the aesthetic
idea.
As seen above, yixiang essentially corresponds to yi, being similar to
Kant’s aesthetic idea in two aspects. How about the parallel between yijing
and Kant’s aesthetic idea? James J. Y. Liu (1962, p. 84; quoted in Gálik 1989,
p. 55) translates jing 境 as “world” (a fusion of emotion and scene). Adele
Austin Rickett translates jing as “state” or “poetic state,” referring to an
aesthetic state (fusing emotion and scene) (Wang Guowei 1977, p. 23).10
Since, as argued above, in the classical Chinese aesthetic context yi appears
similar to Kant’s aesthetic idea rather than rational conception or strategic
intention, the rendering of yijing as intentional mood appears to lack accuracy.
I agree with Peng Feng (2018, pp. 136–137) that the translation of yijing as
artistic conception by many Chinese scholars in the English abstracts of their
papers easily causes confusion for Western scholars.11 Due to parallels
between yi and the Kantian aesthetic idea, one might suggest that yijing is
better rendered as the mindscape of the (aesthetic) idea. However, this
rendering seems a little redundant since, as mentioned above, Kant defines the
aesthetic idea as the intuitive representation of the imagination.
Can yijing be rendered simply as aesthetic idea? Jiang Ronggang (2015,
pp. 170–171) argues that both yixiang and yijing were used in the art
criticism of Yan Fu (1854–1921), Wang Guowei, and Liang Qichao (1873–-
1929) at the end of the Qing dynasty as the Chinese analogical translation
(geyi 格義) of the term “idea” in Western aesthetic writing.12Marián Gálik
(1989, p. 60) argues that the notion of yijing or jingjie proposed by Wang
Guowei receives its philosophical inspiration from Kant’s aesthetic idea,
claiming that “jingjie is precisely such an aesthetic idea [as an intuition of
the imagination].”13 Although in his paper arguing against Luo Gang, Peng
Feng (2018, pp. 135–136) mentions Pohl’s rendering of yijing as “Kunstleri-
sche Idee” (artistic idea) and Gálik’s argument about the philosophical origin
of Wang Guowei’s yijing in Kant’s aesthetic idea, he ignores any possible
correspondence between the understanding of yijing in classical Chinese art
and Kant’s aesthetic idea.14
It is worth noting that there are slight differences in nuance between yi,
yixiang, and yijing in the Chinese texts. Although yi is always associated
with xiang, yi stresses the image-associated idea, while yixiang stresses the
idea-associated image. Yijing appears to stress the mindscape presenting the
image-associated idea, although this mindscape is still essentially a mental
representation of the imagination in a sense similar to Kant’s aesthetic idea.
That is, since the Chinese character jing stresses the mind as the container
of the idea, yijing stresses that the image-associated idea (yi) is formulated in
the artist’s mind, and it can then be aroused in the audience’s mind when
released by the artist into the work and thus constitutes its expressive
content.Philosophy East & West
Parallels between Shen Animating Yi and Kantian Spirit Animating the
Aesthetic Idea
Zhang Dainian (2002, pp. 171, 175) explains that in the case of a human
being, shen (spirit) refers to his “inner nature” (as illustrated in Zhuangzi’s
“perceiving by spirit is contrasted with perceiving by eyes”), and shen or
jingshen (essential spirit) means “the activity of the human mind.” As
mentioned above, both Yu-kung Kao (1991, p. 87) and Pohl (2006, p. 133)
think that in the context of classical Chinese literature the role of the artist’s
shen in evoking artistic imagination and formulating yi corresponds to Kant’s
understanding of spirit as the animating principle of the imagination. For
Kant, spirit is “the animating principle of the mind” for presenting the
aesthetic idea, and it “purposively sets the mental powers into motion, i.e.,
into a play that is self-maintaining and even strengthens the powers to that
end” (KU 5:313). Classical Chinese texts on painting provide evidence of a
parallel between the role of the painter’s shen in perceiving the image-
associated yi and Kant’s notion of the spirit animating aesthetic ideas.
Guo Xi suggests that a painter should feel mentally relaxed as if
“loosening his clothes and sitting with his legs spread out” and nourish in
his mind a state of leisure and harmony; when “your mind becomes fully
calm, upright, loving, and sincere, then [the idea-images of] the varying
emotions and aspects of men, and the different characteristics of objects,
will spontaneously order themselves in your mind and appear without effort
under your brush” (Bush and Shih 2012, p. 157; Yu 1986, p. 640).15
Similarly, Guo Ruoxu stresses that a carefree spirit (shenxian 神閑) is
required for imaginative evocation and establishing ideas (yijing 意定), and
also crucial for the artist to transmit qiyun (see Bush and Shih 2012, p. 97).
For Guo Ruoxu, qiyun “has its root in the carefree wandering of the
spirit [游心]” (Jullien 2012, p. 165).16 Only when the painter’s mind is
satisfied within itself, can his shen remain carefree, and yi be established. At
this moment, the imagination will not “flag,” nor the brush ineffectively
“labor” (Bush and Shih 2012, p. 97). That is, yi emerges spontaneously in
the mind, and is released smoothly into the final image, which embodies
qiyun. Rao Ziran echoes that (the painter’s) shen being carefree supplies
an ideal mental state for attaining yi in the mind, stressing that the painter
should never conceive of yi until his shen reaches that state (see Bush
and Shih 2012, p. 266; Yu 1986, p. 691). The valuing of this mental state
for presenting yi can also be found in Wang Yuanqi’s claim that to release
yi into the final image spontaneously, “one must be leisurely and carefree,
without any secular concerns” and become absorbed spiritually and calm
down when applying the brush to paint (Gao 1996, p. 156). It cannot be
regarded as accidental that Guo Ruoxu, Rao Ziran, and Wang Yuanqi
offer an emphasis similar to Guo Xi’s on the importance of the
untrammeled self-pleasing of the shen for imaginative evocation and
establishing yi.Xiaoyan Hu 361
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Context
However, one may question the efficacy of applying Kant’s account of
genius’ idea-giving to the context of classical Chinese painting. This is for
the reasons discussed below.
Some Significant Differences between Yi and Kant’s Aesthetic Idea
First of all, one may note the fact that Kant’s accounts of genius and the
aesthetic idea are in accord with the general approach of his transcendental
philosophy, while the account of pictorial yi in classical texts was written on
an empirical and pragmatic rather than a systematic basis and in a
suggestive style by numerous artists or connoisseurs who were not
concerned with completing a systematic transcendental philosophy in Kant’s
sense.
Unlike Kant, the classical Chinese artists and connoisseurs are interested
in the actual practical process of producing or appreciating art; their
accounts include practical advice and descriptions with regard to producing
or appreciating masterpieces. Kant is focused more on explaining the
possibility of beautiful art and the working and requisites of genius in
creating beautiful art in a way compatible with his account of aesthetic
judgment and overall philosophical system. His aim is not really to give
advice to aspiring artists, even though his account might include an
occasional passing point of use to them.
One may suggest in response that when one approach is transcendental
and the other is empirical, this does not mean that they cannot be
compatible. Moreover, the understanding of yi appears also to involve a
transcendental element. For instance, Qing-period critic Bu Yantu (ca.
1740), resorts to the Book of Changes to suggest that pictorial yi is like an
omnipresent, universal idea: “In the Book of Change it is omen and all
changes are predicted by it. In painting it is spirit and all manifestations of
nature emerge from it” (Gao 1996, p. 136).17 Bu’s stress on the significance
of yi for painting as analogous to that of an idea omnipresent within the
universe implies that the painter should act like the creator or semi-creator
of the universe in terms of presenting the pictorial idea in his mind and
capturing the spiritual aspect of nature. However, even though the
transcendental element involved in the Chinese aesthetic tradition is worth
noting, we should not forget that, unlike Kant, classical Chinese artists and
critics were not aiming to complete a comprehensive critical aesthetic
system to replace, and synthesize the insights of, the prevalent schools of
early modern Western aesthetics (the rationalism of Baumgarten, and the
empiricism of Locke, Hume, et al.).18
The second issue lies in the fact that the unique expressive charisma of
the idea-image as intuitive representation of the imagination released fromPhilosophy East & West
the classical Chinese painter’s mind into a work and aroused in the
audience’s imagination cannot be explained by Kant’s aesthetics. The yi
established in the painter’s mind and later released into a work reflects an
expressionistic element above merely formal representation on the basis of
its unifying representation and expression. Although Kant’s account of
aesthetic ideas offers theoretical support for artworks merging representation
and expression, the classical Chinese understanding of the image-associated
yi contributes to a qiyun-focused aesthetics in which the expressive
charisma of art is markedly different from that of Western art, and reflects a
perception and understanding of existence as processual.
By examining the analogies between yi, shen, and qiyun within the two
scopes of the object and the work, we shall see that the emphasis on
establishing yi in the mind serves for qiyun shengdong (through spirit
consonance engendering a sense of life) as the first law of classical Chinese
painting, and the innate mental talent for establishing yi is consistent with
that for transmitting qiyun. Yu-kung Kao (1991, pp. 86–87) explains that as
well as referring to the animating principle of generating yi in the artist’s
mind, shen (spirit) can be classified into another two categories: the essential
character of the (animate or inanimate) object, and the expressive quality of
the work.19 The three categories of shen defined by Kao are consistent with
the three categories of qiyun. Where the process of creation by painters is
concerned, qiyun refers to the essential or internal reality of the (animate or
inanimate) object depicted; the qiyun of, or in, the work refers to its
expressive quality or content; and whether the artist can create a work
replete with qiyun is related to the qiyun of the artist (see Hu 2016, pp.
247–268). Jianping Gao (1996, pp. 120–147) suggests that capturing shen,
transmitting qiyun, and establishing yi all refer to capturing the internal,
spiritual reality of the object.
As seen above, where the final work is concerned, yi as analogous to
Kant’s aesthetic idea appears to be the expressive content of the work which
arouses the audience’s imagination, corresponding to the work’s shen or
qiyun as expressive content. As Guo Ruoxu suggests, when yi informs the
brushwork, the final “images [xiang] will correspond” to the idea, and the
“spirit [shen] [will] be whole” in the finished painting (Bush and Shih 2012,
p. 97). Here shen can be understood as that of the object or work, and Xie
He’s term qiyun (spirit consonance) can be used to replace shen. The “spirit
[shen] [will] be whole” in the finished painting can be read thus: the final
work will be replete with qiyun. Although establishing yi in the mind is just
a first step, the significance of releasing yi into a work is analogous to
transmitting qiyun into the work, and success in releasing yi into the final
work contributes to and appears simultaneous with the success in transmit-
ting qiyun.20 As the Ming painter Yun Xiang (1586–1655) claims, “yi is the
master of painting, and when yi (established in the artist’s mind) is released
into the final image, qiyun will be in the work.”21Xiaoyan Hu 363
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the formal appearance and spiritual reality of the object into the images in
the mind of the painter, and guarantees that the inner mental image
“[involves] the realization of a more profound communication with the
object” and also follows the artist’s “inner voice” (Gao 1996, p. 153). From
Jianping Gao’s discussion of pictorial yi(1996, pp. 153–156), we can see
that he stresses that the idea-associated image in the artist’s mind merges the
spiritual feature of the object depicted and the self-expression of the artist.
That is, on the one hand, establishing yi in the painter’s mind points to
penetrating the internal or spiritual feature of the object beyond its
appearance; on the other hand, the yi associated with the mental image
reflects the artist’s feelings and emotions. Thus, yi preceding the brush
requires the painter to be sincere to both nature and himself, to have
spiritual resonance and communion with nature by contemplating it rather
than gazing at its appearance (Gao 1996, pp. 137–139, 146–147, 153).22
Although Yu-kung Kao’s (1991, p. 66) writing does not center on the object
and its spiritual feature, which the artist aims to grasp, he explicitly indicates
that in poetry through yi “interiority and the external world are reconciled,”
and yi “is always the mediating element: it is aroused by either outside or
inside stimuli, it is organized and integrated by the imagination, and it
evolves into the art object.” As argued above, it is clear that this is not
merely for poets; the association of yi with xiang in the mind plays a key
role in motivating the expressive act of painters and in reconciling the
internal mental world of painters and the external natural world.
Since yi is analogous to Kant’s aesthetic idea, this raises the question of
whether Kant’s aesthetic idea suggests in beautiful artworks the unification
of formal representation based on perception and the expression of the
artist’s emotions, feelings, or thinking. Mark L. Johnson (1979, pp. 167–178)
argues that Kant’s aesthetics unifies two descriptions of beauty, “one based
on the perception of formal relations in an object, and the other focused on
the expression of aesthetical ideas.” Samantha Matherne (2013, pp. 31–33)
argues that Kant’s aesthetic idea implies the presentation of two kinds of
emotions: immediate and sudden emotions and thought-connected or
reflective emotions such as envy and love. Even though Kant’s aesthetic idea
also offers theoretical support for art unifying representation and expression,
it should be borne in mind that the mindscape of aesthetic ideas (yijing)
established by classical Chinese artists demonstrates the unique expressionis-
tic charisma of Chinese art that is embodied in these aspects—the aesthetic
flavor of blandness along with the pursuit of the far-reaching, and the
aesthetic interplay of presence and absence, substance and emptiness (see
Jullien 2004, 2012).23 These expressionistic features in qiyun-focused
Chinese art reflect the classical Chinese perception of existence or reality as
a process, and of polarities as harmonized.24 In addition, one may suggest
that unlike Kant, who separates noumenal and phenomenal nature, there isPhilosophy East & West
no such distinction between two perspectives toward nature in Daoist or
Confucian philosophy.25 Even if the Dao may be regarded as something
“above” phenomena, it penetrates phenomena, and Chinese artists seek to
fulfill the Dao through their qiyun-focused painting. This is essentially
different from Kant’s aesthetic goal of seeking an intermediary between
noumena and phenomena through reflection on beauty.26
Some Significant Differences between Shen Animating Yi and the Kantian
Spirit
Unlike Kant, who understands the spirit as the harmonious union of
imagination and understanding, classical Chinese texts on painting claim
that the shen of the artist is required to respond to the shen of the object,
and the artist seeks spiritual kinship and resonance with the congenial
object. Spiritual communion (shenhui 神會) between subject and object
valued under the first law of qiyun shengdong is not accommodated in
Kant’s account of genius.
Regarding the role of the spirit as the animating principle generating
aesthetic ideas in the mind, Kant stresses that the free and harmonious
cooperation of imagination and understanding must play a determinate role
for the “spirit” to work (KU 5:314, 316–318). For Kant, aesthetic taste,
imagination, understanding, and spirit are requisites for genius to create
beautiful artworks (KU 5:320). Although Kant does not deny that aesthetic
judgment involves objects, the focus on the subject rather than the object in
his account of genius is consistent with the focus on the subject hinted at in
his account of aesthetic judgment, according to which the object supplies no
objective standard for the audience to judge its beauty or identify where the
beauty resides. Disinterested aesthetic pleasure and freedom are subjective,
aroused when imagination and understanding co-play freely and harmoniously
(KU 5:203–219). Although aesthetic judgment has its universal validity, this
universality is intersubjective. It is not based on any independently objective
standards or grounds, but rather on the free play of the subject’s imagination
and understanding, and the a priori principle of purposiveness (assuming that
the object suitably and purposively offers the subject disinterested aesthetic
pleasure) (see Wenzel 2005, pp. 33–34). The stress on the free co-play of the
imagination and understanding in his account of aesthetic judgment is
consistent with that in his account of genius creating beautiful art (KU
5:314–319). For Kant, the abundance and originality of aesthetic ideas
animated by the spirit is less important than “the suitability of the imagination
in its freedom to the lawfulness of the understanding” (KU 5:319). The essence
of “the imagination’s free conformity to law” is a kind of “psychologically felt
freedom from any form of constraint . . . [,] not just epistemological
independence from concepts” (Guyer 1993, pp. 286–287).
In contrast to Kant, classical Chinese texts on painting never talk about
the free and harmonious co-play of imagination and understanding in aXiaoyan Hu 365
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the carefree spirit of the artist in imaginative evocation and animating yi.
Although Chinese texts lack a transcendental analysis of the productive
faculties of the mind, we should not forget the distinctive point endorsed by
the Daoist tradition according to which the spirit of the artist engaged in
imaginative evocation is supposed to resonate with the spirit of the object.
The resonance between the spirit-energy of the subject and that of the object
allows the artist’s innate mental disposition successfully to convey qiyun
into a work (see Soper 1949, pp. 421–423; Hay 1983, p. 98; Hu 2016, pp.
253, 257).
This valuing of spiritual resonance between artist and object depicted
can even be found in the early painting texts proceeding Xie He’s statement
of the first law of qiyun shengdong. For instance, the artist and connoisseur
Zong Bing (375–443) implies this spiritual communion with the object in his
praise of “[rejoicing] in the spirit” (changshen 暢神), in his Introduction to
Painting Landscape where he describes the experience of letting his spirit
soar freely through art (Bush and Shih 2012, pp. 37–38; Yu 1986, pp.
583–584). Even though Zong Bing’s description of his rejoicing in the spirit
can be read as suggesting an ideal form of contemplation for appreciators of
art (since he explicitly mentions “unrolling paintings”), later artists echo his
advocacy of such rejoicing. Although Zong Bing’s rejoicing in the spirit
reflects the carefree wandering advocated by Zhuangzi and appears similar
to Kant’s claim of the spirit animating imagination and aesthetic ideas, it is
worth noting that Zong Bing’s account suggests that the spirit of the artist
is supposed to respond to the spirit of the object, and the spirit of the
object is the target of the spirit of the artist seeking spiritual kinship and
resonance. This point can be seen in his claim that “the response by the eye
and the accord by the mind to nature . . . will affect the spirit [shen of
the artist or the connoisseur] and, as the spirit [shen] soars, the truth will be
attained . . . . Furthermore, the spirit [shen], which is essentially limitless,
resides in forms and stimulates all kinds of life” (Bush and Shih 2012, p. 37;
Yu 1986, p. 583).
The text of the Qing critic Shen Zongqian (1736–1820) echoes Zong
Bing’s suggestion, stating that the artist’s lingqi should express the lingqi of
the object through his artwork, and that in creating pictures the artist’s lingqi
is like that of the lingqi creating things in the universe; indeed: “proceeding
from the spirit [lingqi 靈氣], [the object depicted, the artist, and the artwork]
partake of the whims of the spirit [shen]” (Lin 1967, pp. 203–204; Yu 1986,
p. 900).27 In praising the painter who performs like the creator or semi-
creator of nature and whose spirit has infinite potential to express the spirit
of the natural object, his suggestion sounds similar to Bu Yantu’s view
mentioned above that the artist transmitting pictorial yi into painting is like
the creator or semi-creator of the universe endowing the object with the
idea. Although a transcendental element may be identified in this account ofPhilosophy East & West
presenting yi under the play of the artist’s spirit, the stress on spiritual
communion and sympathetic resonance between subject and object is not
involved in Kant’s account of the spirit in his philosophy of art.
Conclusion
In conclusion, centering on the innate mental talent of idea-giving, I have
compared the aesthetics of the classical Chinese and Kant by examining the
parallels and differences between yi (along with yixiang and yijing) and
Kant’s aesthetic idea, between the artist’s shen and the spirit animating
aesthetic ideas. As seen above, the feasibility of projecting Kant’s account of
genius’ idea-giving into a classical Chinese painting context is supported by
these parallels. First, image-associated yi is analogous to Kant’s aesthetic
idea as mental representation of the imagination, which can be perceived
rather than thought. Second, like the aesthetic idea, pictorial yi as the
internalized symbol with evocative power aroused through imagination
before its manifestation in the final work cannot be understood as a rational
idea (intention or conception) or cognitive meaning. Third, the painter’s
shen, which establishes yi in imaginative evocation, appears similar to the
Kantian spirit animating the aesthetic idea.
However, due to the asymmetry between two distinctive cultural
traditions, aesthetic preoccupations, and philosophical approaches, issues
arise especially in relation to these aspects. First, even though yi might
accommodate a certain kind of transcendental element, classical Chinese
aesthetics written on a pragmatic basis does not aim to complete a
transcendental aesthetic system in Kant’s sense. Second, the advocacy of
establishing yi through the carefree wandering of shen reflects the expres-
sionistic pursuit of Chinese artists (led by the first law of qiyun shengdong)
above formal representation on the basis of unifying representation and
expression, and the expressive charisma of qiyun-focused Chinese painting
is markedly different from that of Western art. Third, the artist’s shen is
supposed to respond to the object’s shen, and this emphasis of classical
Chinese aesthetics on sympathetic resonance between the spirit-energy of
subject and that of object is absent in Kant’s account.
Since the approach of Kant’s transcendental aesthetics is different from
that of classical Chinese aesthetics, an exact correspondence cannot be
expected. That said, however, on the one hand, my examination of the
parallels between the two traditions helps to illuminate classical Chinese
aesthetics through the lens of comparison, and understand why earlier
modern Chinese scholars adopted Kantian aesthetics to develop the modern
version of traditional aesthetics. On the other hand, the significant differ-
ences seen above between the two approaches may stimulate further
reflection on whether the so-called “German elements” in the modern
interpretation of classical Chinese aesthetics really do signify “the otheringXiaoyan Hu 367
368of self” that the commentator Luo Gang (2011, pp. 57–58) points to, and
whether the differences undermine the analogies between the two traditions.
Notes
I am very grateful to the valuable feedback given by Professor Simon
Hailwood, Professor Franklin Perkins, and anonymous reviewers. I appre-
ciate the comments of Dr. Nikolaos Gkogkas on an earlier version of this
article. Many thanks to Professor Ralph Weber and the European Association
for Chinese Philosophy for a Young Scholar Award Honourable Mention for
an earlier version of this article (titled “The Master of Qiyun (Spirit
Consonance): Genius as an Innate Mental Talent in Chinese Painting”)
presented at the Second Biennial Conference of the EACP in Basel,
Switzerland on September 9, 2017.
1 – Concerning the six laws of Chinese painting proposed by Xie He and
the notion of qiyun, see Hu 2016, pp. 247–268.
2 – References to Kant’s Third Critique (Kritik der Urtheilskraft) follow the
pagination of vol. 5 of the Akademie edition of Kant’s collected
writings (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1902–). I follow the translation from
Guyer and Matthews, Critique of the Power of Judgment (Kant 2001).
3 – Guo Ruoxu’s text regarding qiyun suggests that the innate mental
disposition is related to the artist’s moral character. Kant implies that
genius involves a moral dimension (KU 5:326). The similarity or
otherwise of classical Chinese views on the moral dimension of genius
and Kant’s account is not my concern in this article.
4 – Kao (1991, pp. 85, 88) renders yi in painting as “intent” and
“meaning,” but does not link yi in painting with Kant’s aesthetic idea.
5 – Yi’s two synonyms yixiang 意象 and yijing 意境 are key words in
modern and contemporary discussions of classical Chinese art criti-
cism. Among Chinese scholars in recent years there has been furious
debate about the philosophical origin of the theory of yijing in classical
poetry criticism proposed by Wang Guowei (1887–1927), and further
developed by Zhu Guangqian, Zong Baihua, and Li Zehou in Chinese
art criticism. Luo Gang (2011, pp. 38–58) argues that Wang Guowei’s
theory of yijing was constructed by adopting the German aesthetics of
Kant, Schiller, and Schopenhauer, and the modern theory of yijing is
another version of German aesthetics.
6 – This insight supports his arguments about internalization and symboli-
zation in Chinese aesthetics (Kao 1991, pp. 47–90).
7 – Few scholars question the translations of youyi 有意 (with intention or
being intentional or conscious) and wuyi 無意 (without intention orPhilosophy East & West
being unintentional or unconscious) in classical texts. Zhang Dainian
(2002, p. 409) classifies yi in classical Chinese philosophy into two
categories: voluntative intention and cognitive idea.
8 – Kant suggests that art should appear unintentional even though an
intention is behind genius’s creation (KU 5:306–307). However, the
parallels and differences between Chinese aesthetics and Kant’s ideas
with regard to artistic spontaneity are not my concern in this article;
see Hu 2017, pp. 246–274.
9 – Wenzel (2005, pp. 43, 49–51) argues that unlike cognitive judgment,
which requires a determinate harmonious relationship of imagination
and understanding through which “the representation of the object is
determined by concepts,” the free and harmonious play of imagination
and understanding in aesthetic judgment merely involves a cognition
in general, in that the understanding does not fix the imagination by
any determinate concepts, and “the object is not even cognized as an
object.” However, “although cognition is not intended in such free
play, our capacity for cognition is strengthened by it” (p. 62).
10 – Rickett translates jingjie 境界 (a synonym of yijing) as “realm” or
“sphere of reality delineated” (Wang Guowei 1977, pp. 23–24) and
yijing as “meaning and [poetic] state” (p. 26).
11 – Peng’s rendering of yijing as “mindscape” might be inspired by Yu-
kung Kao’s (1986, p. 385) translation of jingjie as “inscape,” which is
“as defined by Jonathan Culler [1975,p. 175], who suggests it as a
‘moment of epiphany’, . . . ‘a moment of revelation in which form is
grasped and surface becomes profundity’.” Kao (1991, p. 74) also
translates yijing as “inscape” or “ideational state.”
12 – Jiang (2015, pp. 170–171) mentions that similar to yijing and yixiang,
another Chinese term guannian 觀念 corresponds to the Western term
“idea.” In his translation of Kant’s Third Critique, Zong Baihua (1994,
pp. 360–367) translates idea as guannian. Since Kant defines the
aesthetic idea as the representation of the imagination, it is interesting
to note that Zong Baihua (1994, pp. 360–366) translates the represen-
tation (of the imagination) as biaoxiang 表象.
13 – The question of whether the main philosophical origin of Wang
Guowei’s theory of yijing is from Kant’s account of the aesthetic idea,
or whether he was partially inspired by Kant’s thought to use the term
yijing to construct his own modern version of classical poetry criticism,
is not my concern here.
14 – Peng Feng (2018, pp. 136–138) states that he finds no term in Western
aesthetics with any similarity to yijing.Xiaoyan Hu 369
37015 – The story of the painter “loosening his clothes and sitting with his legs
spread out” referred to by Guo Xi is originally recorded by Zhuangzi
(2013, p. 172), and the carefree spiritual state is echoed by later artists
as necessary for imaginative evocation and spontaneous creation.
16 – As Jullien (2012, p. 165) notes, Guo Ruoxu’s term “the carefree
wandering of the spirit” borrows from Zhuangzi.
17 – Jianping Gao (1996, pp. 136–137) suggests that yi is analogous to
Plato’s Idea. Whether it is appropriate to regard yi in the painter’s mind
as analogous to Plato’s Ideas is not my concern here.
18 – What Kant means by “transcendental” refers to what lies beyond the
limitation of knowledge gained through our experience, “with respect
to the a priori conditions and elements of our experience” (Wenzel
2005, p. 155). Despite some similarities, the “transcendental” element
of tian as empowering artistic spontaneity in the classical Chinese
artistic context is not quite the same as Kant’s sense. There is no space
for me to pursue this issue further here.
19 – Zong-qi Cai (2004, pp. 310–342) discusses the philosophical origins
and aesthetic significance of shen in texts on literature and painting in
the Six Dynasties in five categories.
20 – The technical issue of artistic practice relating to yi and qiyun is
beyond my concern here.
21 – My translation of 畫以意為主, 意至而氣韻出焉 (惲向, 《跋<山水
冊>》). It is true that there is no guarantee that pictorial yi or qiyun
will be embodied in the painting, while it is regarded as a failure when
the work lacks yi or qiyun (see Eugene Wang 2007, pp. 463–481).
22 – Influenced by classical Chinese processual metaphysics, the perceptual way
that classical Chinese artists contemplate the object rather than gazing at it
offers the technical basis for self-expression above formal representation.
23 – There is no space here to explain the expressionistic features of
Chinese painting in detail.
24 – Concerning the dialectic of harmonization of polarities in Daoism and
Confucianism, see Cheng 2006, pp. 26–35.
25 – Wenzel (2010, p. 331) notes that the Dao in Confucian philosophy
does not involve a phenomenal-noumenal distinction. Simon Shengjian
Xie (2010, p. 806) claims that the Dao in Laozi’s texts is “what Kant
calls noumena.” I think that Wenzel’s view is correct and Xie’s view is
inaccurate but have no space to argue that here.
26 – For Kant, although noumena (things in themselves) are inaccessible,
through reflective judgment on beauty, cognitive knowledge of anPhilosophy East & West
external, mechanical nature, and the moral autonomy of inner nature
find an intermediary rather than standing at two unbridgeable
precipices (see Düsing 1990, pp. 79–92).
27 – Lin (1967, pp. 203–204) translates lingqi 靈氣 as “spirit”; in the context
here it approximately equates to shen.References
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